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THE DECAY OF COMMERCIAL MULTILATERALISM IN SOUTH 
AMERICA 
JORGE PÉREZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Commercial multilateralism is losing spaces in South America to regional 
and bilateral agreements due to the lack of normative and empirical legitimacy 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  This developing process is analyzed 
in the following article from the conceptual context of parts of the extensive 
and rich work by Julia Barragán.  Her work also contributes with tools for 
acknowledging the strength of formal and informal institutions, value 
categorization and the relevance of normative goals in the search of better 
development options for South America.  In the content, institutions are 
considered, as well as nominal and underlying dimensions, as the game rules 
which in negotiation define the commercial interaction structure; besides, they 
offer a causal link with the limits of the possible universe of expected utilities 
by the actors involved, consecration of acknowledged values and defining the 
goals that may establish a clean game in free trade agreements.   
Most countries of South America have begun negotiation, subscription and 
operation processes for commercial agreements.  Most of these negotiations 
are bilateral and, to a lesser degree, regional in scope.1  These agreements start 
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(www.gigei.net).  The author gratefully acknowledges the help of Falon Wrigley, Greg Murphy 
and Tony Albrecht for their generous support.  The author also thanks Salim Awad for translating 
portions of this article. 
 1. In the process of structuring trade agreements in South America, the following are 
considered important: (A) Sub-regional Processes: Andean Community (CAN), Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Bolivarian Alternative 
for the Americas (ALBA), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), MERCOSUR-Bolivia 
and MERCOSUR-Chile; (B) Bilateral Free Trade Agreements: Chile-Colombia, Chile-Perú, 
Chile-Ecuador, Chile-México and México-Uruguay; (C) CAN-MERCOSUR Convergence: 
MERCOSUR-Perú and MERCOSUR-Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela; (D) Selective Agreements: 
Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-México, Brasil-México, Brasil-Uruguay, Cuba-MERCOSUR, 
Cuba-Venezuela, MERCOSUR-México and México-Perú; (E) Other Agreements: 
Argentina-Bolivia-Brasil-Paraguay-Uruguay and Argentina-Ecuador; (F) Integration with other 
countries and areas of Latin America: Chile-Guatemala and Colombia-Central America; (G) 
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out with principles that intend to establish an interactive structure allowing for 
the possibility of establishing dynamics for exchanging goods and services that 
benefit the parties equally.2 Although many free trade agreements have been 
signed, the WTO’s multilateral normative space has been losing its influence 
in South America, which is an additional sign of business multilateralism 
decadence.3 
Many causes could be established to explain the decay of the multilateral 
trade regulatory frame’s decadence.  Nevertheless, this article intends to point 
out the weaknesses in the normative legitimacy and application of the rules 
negotiated and approved by the WTO.  This analysis4 is based on 
considerations of the strength of the transcendent force of the institutions as the 
rules that required an axiological base to support their normative legitimacy 
and the efficiency in the achievement of their goals in order to recognize their 
empirical legitimacy.  Additionally, the content of this article establishes some 
nominal and real characteristics of the values, goals and ideas that signal the 
structure and properties of the formality of the instruments as well as the 
 
Extraregional Negotiations: (1) Andean Community: Andean Community-European Union, 
Colombia and Perú-AELC, Colombia and Perú-Canada, Colombia-U.S. v. Perú-China, Perú-U.S. 
and Perú-Singapore; (2) MERCOSUR: MERCOSUR-Cooperation Council for the Arab States of 
the Gulf, MERCOSUR-South Korea, MERCOSUR-Israel, MERCOSUR-SACU and 
MERCOSUR-European Union; (3) Chile: Chile-Australia, Chile-China, Chile-Japan, Chile-
Malaysia and Chile-Turkey; and (4) México: México-South Korea.  See generally Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI), Informe Del Secretario General Sobre La Evolución 
Del Proceso De Integración Regional Durante el Año 2007 [Secretary General’s Report on the 
Process of Regional Integration During the Year 2007], ALADI/SEC/di 2136, Mar. 7, 2008, 
available at http://www.aladi.org/nsfaladi/estudios.nsf/inicio2004. 
 2. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW TRADE 
CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT 12, 19, 25 (2005) (explaining how free trade and its 
improvements in social well-being bases itself on the absolute advantage as articulated by Adam 
Smith (1776), comparative advantage as articulated by David Ricardo (1816), and Paul 
Samuelson’s arguments on efficiency (1938)). 
 3. See World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2008) (“Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) have become in recent years a very prominent feature of the Multilateral 
Trading System (MTS).  The surge in RTAs has continued unabated since the early 1990s.  Some 
380 RTAs have been notified to the GATT/WTO up to July 2007. Of these, 300 RTAs were 
notified under Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 22 under the Enabling Clause; 
and 58 under Article V of the GATS. At that same date, 205 agreements were in force.  If we take 
into account RTAs which are in force but have not been notified, those signed but not yet in 
force, those currently being negotiated, and those in the proposal stage, we arrive at a figure of 
close to 400 RTAs which are scheduled to be implemented by 2010.  Of these RTAs, free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements account for over 90%, while customs unions 
account for less than 10%.”). 
 4. The approach of the study is not limited and considers interdisciplinary legal analysis. 
See Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 761, 777–78 (1987). 
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underlying net in the free trade agreements.  Finally, many causal relationships 
are established between the structures of the game that define the rules in the 
agreements and their economical, social, environmental and political impacts. 
The institution’s, i.e., the free trade agreement’s, strong economic 
performance is based on reducing the uncertainty by establishing a stable 
structure, but not necessarily an efficient one of equilibrium for the interaction 
of the parties who may participate in a common space.  However, the relative 
certainty and reduction of trade costs given by the institutions does not imply, 
in any way, a symmetry or equality of conditions for the parties involved in its 
negotiation or application.5  The institutions may determine the opportunities 
between two societies and, as they evolve, influence the distribution of utilities 
of these participants in the transnational social game.  Thus, the participants’ 
utilities are directly proportional to the institutional framework that rules them. 
The decreases in uncertainty levels and transaction costs that may lead to a 
free trade agreement do not apply only in the formative negotiation of rules.  
They also apply in the application of deontological limits on the actions 
developed under such agreements, the management of conflicts or 
transgressions, the control and sanctions, and the appropriate design of a body 
of incentives and fixing of values that the constructors of the rules may share.  
In the long term, those factors shall define the normative efficiency of the 
institutional agreements accomplished.6  In general, “institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society” that shape human, economic and social interaction.7  
Ultimately, the institutions limit the range of choices for the individuals and 
define the form of the game.  “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, are humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.  In consequence, they structure incentives in the human exchange, 
whether political, social or economic.”8 
When a free trade agreement is approved by the states and is tied to the 
current system, it not only becomes the institution that defines the rules of the 
game among the participant states, but it also acquires a coercive force that 
becomes mandatory for the regulated parties even when it does not refer to a 
common fundamental rule.  Nevertheless, despite the mandatory fulfillment of 
the formal requisites by the parties, the rules of the game do not justify the 
 
 5. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 29 (1960). 
 6. See Julia Barragán, Eficacia Normativa [Effective Norms], in TEMAS FUNDAMENTALES 
DE ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DEL DERECHO 5–16 (Venezuelan Law & Economics Association 
1997). 
 7. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). 
 8. Id. 
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normative validity or empirical efficiency of the established norms.9  In fact, 
when a rule is imposed in the commercial interchange exchange between two 
parties or countries, it is based on the pretense of normative correction—i.e., it 
is supposed that its value base has a hierarchy by virtue of its particular 
correction.10  This sphere of axiological analysis is of special consideration in 
the study of commercial agreements because it goes beyond the formal reasons 
and introduces the transcendence of alternative systems of values that may 
establish great differences in the tendencies and results. 
Besides the required coherence in the legal structure of the countries 
involved, the established rules must harmonize with the moral principles 
recognized by the parties.11  Without such harmony, these agreements shall not 
have normative legitimacy and shall hardly accomplish empirical legitimacy.  
The decision of assuming a commercial agreement as mandatory necessarily 
implies an assumption of a system of values, which in many cases is not 
expressed prima facie because the system is not discussed openly, the values 
are considered as unquestionable by the participants or the values are confused 
with the facts.  Nevertheless, the established norms shall not have their 
corrective function without a common system of values.12  Whichever 
axiological system is adopted, it carries a process of comparison between the 
alternative values using ethical categories to choose the desired system of 
values, based on the reasons derived by the power of the parties or their 
experiences.13  Additionally, the decision that elevates one system of values 
 
 9. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 273–74 (1999) (considers that values 
emerge in four ways: (1) reflection, (2) imitating conventions, (3) public discussion, and (d) 
evolutionary solutions). 
 10. Barragán, supra note 6. 
 11. Julia Barragán, Problemas de Formación de las Decisiones Normativas en Escenarios 
de Culturas Diversas [Issues in Regulatory Decision Making Between Diverse Cultures], 13 
RELEA 81–100 (Centro de Investigaciones Postdoctorales 2001). 
 12. See JULIA BARRAGÁN, CÓMO SE HACEN LAS LEYES [How Laws are Made] 78 (1994) 
(“Without any doubt, in order for the law to accomplish efficiently its regulatory function of 
social behavior, even in a situation of cultural diversity, must go beyond the positivist focus and 
accept that the law is a vehicle of an expression of values and directives of behavior related 
directly to what every society is and aspires to be.” (English translation)). 
 13. John Harsanyi, Una Teoría de Valores Prudenciales y una Teoría de la Moralidad 
Utilitarista de la Regla [A Theory of Prudential Values and a Theory of the Rule of Utilitarian 
Morality], 6 TELOS: REVISTA IBEROAMERICANA DE ESTUDIOS UTILITARISTAS 59, 67 (Julia 
Barragán trans., 1997) (“Consequently, the values and moral norms considered superior are those 
which produce the maximum benefit to society viewed as a whole, and judged from a point of 
view of equality and impartiality.  In previous publications I tried to demonstrate that impartiality 
in the considerations of social well being can be measured by its function as social utility, which 
is defined as the mathematical measure of functional utility of all individuals in society.  In that 
way, the basic principle of the utilitarian theory can also be expressed by affirming that the 
criterio básico racional evaluates our moral norms, moral values, and morality as a whole and its 
social utility.”  (English translation)). 
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over another requires clarity over the principles of theoretical reason as well as 
the practical reasons.14  The election of the system of values may be 
established only by arbitrary criteria of value, which in a trade agreement is 
often inclined toward the party with more negotiating power.  However, the 
criteria may be based in a rational election involving theoretical and practical 
elements, and it may lead to equilibrated utilities for the parties.  The 
comparison of values effectuated in a regional or multilateral agreement shall 
be adapted to its specific context (it is not the same reality for the northern 
countries as it is for the southern countries) in order to establish the basic 
conditions of priority and order among the values that may or may not conflict.  
In this way the proper information is necessary in relation to the specific 
relative weight of the societies involved.15  On the value structures of trade 
agreements, the fact that there is not a universal order for establishing values 
makes it necessary to value these principles to establish a hierarchy under 
certain conditions.16  Ultimately, the sum of values produced by the negotiation 
is reflected in the established norms. 
On the other side, the legitimacy of the agreements involves the 
understanding of the ends.  A bilateral or regional agreement may have several 
alternative objectives.  It may be limited to establishing rules for commercial 
interaction, extended as an instrument of geopolitical or geostrategic control or 
as a pretense to solve social problems of grave political incidence. 
The reason for drafting a commercial agreement is mostly because a 
preceding calculus has detected some problem to be solved and the agreement 
offers a means to achieve a desired objective.  If it is assumed that every rule in 
an agreement intends to solve a problem, expressed or not, it is accepted that 
one of the main phases in the negotiation of an agreement is the definition of 
goals.  These goals are limited by the necessity of contribution to the social 
well-being.17  The difficulty of building common goals for two or more states 
 
 14. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, NUEVA CRÍTICA DE LA RAZÓN PURA [Critique of 
Practical Reason] (1984). 
 15. Clifford S. Russell et al., Searching for Evidence of Alternative Preferences, Public As 
Opposed to Private 2–3 (Vanderbilt Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 01-W01, 2001), 
available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/working01.html (presenting an empirical 
study in Denmark and the United States, that supports the existence of preference for the public 
instead of private, highlighting thinkers such as Harsanyi, Arrow, Sen, Kolm, Beckerman and 
Pasek, and cites critics to the principle of utilities theory). 
 16. SEN, supra note 9, at 269 (discussing the efficient provisions of public goods, where it is 
necessary to consider not only state action and public provision, but also social values). 
 17. See Julia Barragán, La Función de Bienestar Colectivo Como Decisión Racional [The 
Function of Collective Well-Being as a Rational Decision], in 9 DOXA 91, 92, 102, 109, 111, 116 
(Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1991) (discussing how, in attempting to harmonize 
individual and social interests, Harsanyi’s proposal contributes to overcome confusions on 
general well-being generated by KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 
(1951); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: IT’S 
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involved in an agreement becomes more complicated when the time comes to 
compare value appreciations based only on the negotiating power of the parties 
and not by a normative authority as it happens in the interior of normative 
systems.  It may be accepted that the decision related to the goals is an act of 
political will that it is not based only on formal requirements but goes beyond 
the spaces of rational negotiation18 or adaptability.19  For those negotiations to 
be considered rational,20 the actors necessarily must be able to order their 
preferences coherently, value them and, at the same time, produce an 
interchange of utilities with their counterparts on the basis that there is a 
maximum benefit that is compatible with the expected benefits of the other.  
The criteria for evaluating the norms of an agreement in relation to the 
objectives idealized (i.e., the evaluation of its efficiency) leads to a 
determination of the empirical legitimacy of the established rule to regulate 
trade exchange.  The follow-up of efficiency requires monitoring the norms in 
their ethical, logic-linguistic and pragmatic dimensions.21 Simultaneously, the 
three dimensions have relevant social, environmental and political aspects in 
prospective sceneries. 
To analyze (ex-post), to prospect (ex-ante) or to monitor (during) a 
commercial agreement is a complex task that may integrate theoretical and 
methodological references of diverse disciplines where the paradigmatic 
concept of efficiency is introduced.22  To warrant the efficiency of an 
agreement requires more than just formal requirements.  It is necessary to 
investigate the agreement’s legitimacy and adaptability to the environment.  To 
determine if the agreements comply with the expected goals, one must 
determine if the normative base is preserved.  The variations of empirical 
 
MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE (1986)); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1999) (1971)). 
 18. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, LA CONFIANZA [Confidence] 56 (1998) (Expressly about the 
diversity of rationalities, “[modern economists have a tendency to identify rational objectives 
with the maximization of the utility, generally understood as the consumer’s greater benefit.  In 
this aspect, various traditional cultures (including the western traditional culture) are irrational or 
simply irrational. . . .  Only a considerable intellectual arrogance is sufficient to believe that only 
your own economic objectives and be considered rational in the strict sense of the term.]” English 
translation)).  See also ERASMO DE ROTTERDAM, ELOGIO DE LA LOCURA [Erasmus of Rotterdam, 
In Praise of Folly] (Rogelio Carvajal Dávila, ed., 2001) (highlighting in his work that the world is 
a theatre in which madness has the principal paper, even though one ought to be able to find 
happiness in the world, and the madness praises itself for the trifles it causes men to commit). 
 19. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS 
OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 4, 47 (1997). 
 20. SEN, supra note 9, at 249.  According to Sen, using reasoning to identify and promote 
better societies has been used in the past and continues to be used. 
 21. BARRAGÁN, supra note 12, at 85–86. 
 22. See Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic 
Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 817 (1989). 
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validity are associated with the adaptability of the agreement to its directed 
social world, which may be related to the agreement per se or may just be one 
of many other factors that may be related with the beliefs or behaviors of the 
regulated subjects. 
When the agreements separate themselves from their people’s reality, they 
lose legitimacy.  Even when an agreement is approved with all the legal 
requisites by the participant states, the normative and empirical legitimacy is a 
matter of fact and may be absent from a commercial agreement.  Thus, it is 
necessary to analyze the agreements present in South America by comparing 
their expected goals with the goals they have achieved or may achieve while 
keeping in mind the tension they suffer when a conflict is present.23 
LEGITIMACY OF THE WTO 
The intense economic relationships brought about through the competing 
regulatory capacities of the state participants in the international concert 
produced the WTO as a normative space based on institutional arrangements of 
multilateral character.24  The main characteristic of the WTO is the supremacy 
of the states with the negotiating capacity to establish the values each supports 
and to achieve the goals that legitimize the organization normatively and 
empirically.  Pre-normative times especially define the interaction structure 
among states involved in negotiations. The divergence of axiological 
backgrounds succumbs under the imposition of the strongest parties, which 
push away the possibility of solutions searching for equilibriums between the 
parties involved and deny the possibility of derivative solutions.  According to 
Julia Barragán, “the games of negotiation and the confrontation happen 
continuously in the elaboration of the normative space correspondent with 
multilateral economic relations, thus it shall be naïve to calculate the possible 
results of the first if the second are not defined.”25 
The GATT, as a predecessor instrument, has suffered a transformation 
from an intergovernmental agreement to a WTO supranational incipient regime 
that has generated diverse impacts, especially in the development politics of 
southern countries.  In its trajectory, the normative space contained in the 
WTO has maintained privileges that weaken the confidence in the multilateral 
system, whether by maintaining privileges prior to the agreements, failing to 
apply norms in some countries, safeguarding interests in specific sectors, such 
 
 23. See generally Julia Barragán, El Costo Social de las Autoexcepciones [The Social Cost 
of Automatic Exceptions], 6 TELOS: REVISTA IBEROAMERICANA DE ESTUDIOS UTILITARISTAS 
83 (1997). 
 24. See Julia Barragán, La Construcción del Espacio Normativo de las Relaciones 
Económicas Multilaterales [The Building of a Normative Space in Multilateral Economic 
Relations], OMC 13 (Venezuelan Law and Economics Assocation 2000). 
 25. Id. at 17. 
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as agriculture and textiles, and imposing subsidies and technical barriers by 
normalization.26  The established practice of side agreements created gray 
areas that allowed for the violation of obligations.27  Additionally, the rounds 
maintained a special interest in industrial products and the mobility of capital 
and services important for the North, and they simultaneously built barriers for 
strong sectors in the countries of the South, which led the southern countries to 
believe that they have nothing to win in a multilateral forum.28 
On the other hand, with the growth of globalization, the strong 
transnational players sponsor general rules that restrict the intervention of 
states in the construction of capacities to participate in international markets, 
creating the idea that governmental intervention creates an unfair advantage.  
Therefore, the strong nations put pressure on politics and instruments by the 
unification of thought on the basis that it is the best practice from the North’s 
point of view.  “The range of the multilateral system and the frontier of 
commercial politics expanded with topics previously contained by politics of 
development in general, with the characteristic of pretending to limit the 
capacity of governments to modify the pattern of comparative advantages and 
commercial flows.”29 
Additionally, some countries in the South obtained positive results in some 
sectors, especially the Asian countries and South American countries like 
Brazil, Chile or Argentina, which attracted public attention and posed a threat 
to the northern countries.30  Simultaneously, from 1980 to 1996, following the 
so-called Washington Consensus, the northern countries started to divulge the 
 
 26. Some call it the grandfather clause and a waiver to escape the rules. 
 27. Laura Rojas, Políticas de Comercio e Industria después de la Ronda de Uruguay 
[Policies of Commerce and Industry After the Uruguay Round], OMC 114 (Venezuelan Law and 
Economics Association 2000). 
 28. Elements of discomfort within the game structure caused northern countries to accept a 
special treaty different from the southern countries, but through the Non-Reciprocal Clause 
(GATT, Part IV, 1965) and the Enabling Clause (GATT, 1975), those treaties affected only 
unproductive sectors in the South. 
 29. Rojas, supra note 27, at 117. 
 30. Paul Krugman, Does Third World Growth Hurt First World Prosperity?, HARVARD 
BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1994, at 113–14 (“These new fears are exemplified in a letter circulated 
early this year by Klaus Schwab, president of the World Economic Forum, which hosts the 
famous Davos conferences. Schwab asked a large number of people to provide input for a 
document he had been asked to prepare for UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, entitled 
‘Redefining the Basic Assumptions of Mankind.’ To indicate what he had in mind, Schwab 
offered a sample redefinition. Traditionally, he wrote, the world was divided into rich countries 
with high productivity and high wages and poor countries with low productivity and low wages. 
But now, he noted, some countries combine high productivity with low wages. The growing 
presence of those countries in world markets is leading, Schwab argued, to a ‘massive 
redeployment of productive assets,’ which is making it impossible for advanced nations to 
maintain their standards of living. In other words, competition from the emerging economies of 
the Third World has become a threat, perhaps the threat, to the economies of the First World.”). 
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thesis of the necessity to impose market rules on the South, forgetting that they 
needed to develop the markets of the South first.  The need to level the playing 
field produced the application of a reverse, special and differential treatment 
that contained the devastating idea of imposing major disciplines in the South 
that restricted the development possibilities for fear of the South. 
According to the experience, it is the contradiction between the nominal 
speech of trade liberalization and an underlying reality regarding the adequacy 
of the institutional legal structure of the world economy (supported collaterally 
by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) that confirms the 
stronger northern nations’ intention of implanting a supranational order 
restricting the growth possibilities of South America. 
The negotiation, formalization and application of WTO rules have been 
assumed as a game that has structured a zero-sum scenario and not as a 
convergence space that helps define the rules regarding symmetry toward 
interests of the parties involved.31 
The maintaining of phases in the establishment of rules32 in the real 
structure of an asymmetric confrontation game and the duality of a nominal 
speech have delegitimized the normative and pragmatic influence and the 
benefits that the WTO may carry to the potentiality of resources in South 
America.33  The WTO, by being far away from the functions of multilateral 
 
 31. According to Paul Krugman, literature has divulged an erroneous concept of 
international trade game in a series of books that do not follow scientific criteria of political 
economics.  Paul Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 
1994, at 28 (citing WILLIAM S. DIETRICH, IN THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE (1991); JEFFREY E. GARTEN, A COLD PEACE: 
AMERICA, JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY (1992); EDWARD N. 
LUTTWAK, THE ENDANGERED AMERICAN DREAM: HOW TO STOP THE UNITED STATES FROM 
BECOMING A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY AND HOW TO WIN THE GEO-ECONOMIC STRUGGLE FOR 
INDUSTRIAL SUPREMACY (1993); IRA C. MAGAZINER & MARK PATINKIN, THE SILENT WAR: 
INSIDE THE GLOBAL BUSINESS BATTLES SHAPING AMERICA’S FUTURE (Vintage Books 1990); 
IRA C. MAGAZINER & ROBERT B. REICH, MINDING AMERICA’S BUSINESS: THE DECLINE AND 
RISE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (Vintage Books 1983); KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, STAYING ON TOP: 
THE BUSINESS CASE FOR NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY (1984); CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, 
JR., TRADING PLACES: HOW WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD (1988); WAYNE 
SANDHOLTZ ET AL., THE HIGHEST STAKES: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEXT 
SECURITY SYSTEM (1992)); LESTER C. THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC 
BATTLE AMONG JAPAN, EUROPE, AND AMERICA (1992); LAURA D’ANDREA TYSON, WHO’S 
BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (1993). 
 32. For an analysis on the steps of the normative formation process (pre-normative, 
normative and post-normative), see BARRAGÁN, supra note 12. 
 33. South America has a territory of 17.870.218 km², which equals 12% of the global area; a 
population greater than 377 million people, which equals 6% of the world’s population; and 
important reserves of natural resources with more than 337 MMMBLs of proven oil reserves, 
which includes extra-heavy oil, more than 254BPC of gas, 27% of the world’s freshwater 
reserves, and important biodiversity. 
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normative solutions in South America,34 has incentivized the search for 
alternative ways through regional and bilateral commercial agreements. 
From another point of view, the exclusive benefits for social groups 
directly related to products in international markets originated with the 
concentration of utilities in a few local areas with the protection of the WTO.35  
With the exception of China, poverty has increased in the last fifteen years of 
the 20th century and this new 21st century.  Out of the 6.5 billion people in the 
world, around fifty percent live in poverty.36  According to World Bank 
statistics, 3.3 billion people live in rural areas.37  One billion people live on less 
than one dollar per day and are unable to meet their basic needs.  Of those one 
billion people, 850 million live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for 
their survival.38  Another example of contradiction of speech that maintains the 
northern countries is presented in the grave problem that results in South 
American people emigrating toward Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) countries.39 
In South America the normative space generated by the WTO also has 
loose space with bilateral and regional instruments that replace the 
international regulatory frame to secondary levels as a response to the 
 
 34. However, exports have increased (from $50 billion to more than $300 billion), as have 
imports (from $100 billion to more than $200 billion) from 1994–2005.  South America’s 
participation in world trade has been declining consistently from 1980 to 2001 when its 
participation equaled 20%. Latin American Integration Association, Statistics 2001/Analysis 
Boon Allen. 
 35. THEOTONIO DOS SANTOS, IMPERALISMO Y DEPENDENCIA [Imperalism and Dependence] 
307–09 (1986) (Santos discusses that the unit we define as a historical situation shapes a certain 
structure of the global economy and promotes economic development in some countries over 
others.  In addition, the unit determines the possibilities of developing domestic economies, 
constituted as the economic and social realities that give the necessary linkage between the 
interests of hegemonic centers and dominant interests in the subsidiaries.  The “external” is non-
domination by practical principle. “It is only possible when the domination found support in 
national sectors that benefit from it.”). 
 36. UNDERSTANDING POVERTY xiii (Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee et al. eds., 2006).  The 
authors base their findings on a $2 poverty line. 
 37. See WORLD BANK INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, WATER MANAGEMENT IN 
AGRICULTURE: TEN YEARS OF WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE, 1994–2004 59 (2006). 
 38. According to OECD, more than 200 million people in Latin America are living in 
poverty.  See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Latin American 
Economic Outlook 2008 14 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,3343,en 
_2649_33973_38789800_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 39. Asymmetry can be seen in the rules imposed by the North.  The European Union Return 
Directive is one example where there is present a tit for tat dynamic, or eye for an eye, tooth for a 
tooth of the Old Testament. The European Parliament has voted 369 in favor, 197 against and 106 
abstentions for the norms of repatriation of immigrants. 
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historical tendency to keep intraregional trade at low levels.40  The turn of 
South America from multilateral commerce toward bilateral agreements is 
based on the hope of finding a way to spur economical, social and political 
development, which is based on the belief that these agreements may help to 
increase the access of goods and services, increase local productivity, decrease 
technology costs and create an equilibrium environment that allows peaceful 
living. 
Perhaps the greatest divergence between normative legitimacy and its 
empirical approximation41 is the contradiction between the values supporting 
the WTO and the reality of the behavior of its strong actors.  Trade 
liberalization is one of the WTO’s main principles.  There is, however, a 
contradiction between the organization’s values and the facts, mainly in 
agricultural subsidies.  From 1986 to 1988, the sector subsidies constituted 
fifty-one percent of total agricultural production of OECD.  In 2002, they were 
more than $300 million, which was fourty-eight percent of production.42  In 
addition, the barriers to entry present another reason to question the legitimacy 
of the WTO, as they are four times higher in the northern countries than in the 
southern countries.43 Finally, do not forget the importance of subtle taxation 
barriers.44 
 
 40. Since World War II, the primary objectives left behind the development of neighboring 
countries.  This is a reality that may be overcome with the new regional coalitions.  In the case of 
Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), there is only 25% in intraregional trade.  The situation 
is worse for Comunidad Andina, with only 10% of intraregional trade.  WORLD BANK, WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2002). 
 41. See generally JULIA BARRAGÁN, LA CIENCIA Y LOS CRITERIOS DE VERDAD EN LA 
METODOLOGÍA DE LA INVESTGACIÓN EMPÍRICA [Science and the Criteria of Truth in Empirical 
Research Methodology] (1975). 
 42. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 85 (2006) (“The average 
European cow gets a subsidy of $2 a day (the World Bank measure of poverty); more than half of 
the people in the developing world live on less than that.  It appears that it is better to be a cow in 
Europe than to be a poor person in a developing country.”). 
 43. After implementation of the Uruguay Round, the average OECD tax on imports from 
developer countries was four times higher than exports with OECD origin. Sam Laird, Market 
Access Issues and the WTO: An Overview, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A 
HANDBOOK 97, 101–02 (2002). 
 44. See STIGLITZ & CHARLTON supra note 2, at 174–77, 235. 
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FORMAL AND UNDERLYING FUNDAMENTALS 
Free trade agreements are based on formal and informal institutions,45 
similar to the two faces of the Roman god Janus—the formal institutions 
correspond with Jano Patulsio and the informal ones with Jano Clusivio.46  As 
the god Janus has a double function, formal institutions converge with logical-
linguistic structures that appear in texts on the front door, along with an 
underlying system of informal institutions that include knowledge, aptitudes 
and beliefs that appear on the back door. 
According to Julia Barragán, the search for efficiency in ethical solutions 
without the proper functioning of the underlying set of rules of normative 
ethics runs the risk of constituting another legal system.47  This situation 
becomes even more complex in the case of the free trade agreement, due to the 
involvement of nations with different backgrounds and situations.  Law, as a 
regulating instrument of social relations, often encounters the fact that inside 
the limits that define its application, several cultural diversities coexist.48  The 
formal components of free trade agreements contain values and goals derived 
from the parties’ accepted beliefs, which are maintained by a value of 
imminent and transcendental truth.49  These values and goals are mostly 
imposed by the dominant negotiating culture in the processes of negotiation 
that gets to define the structure of the game as a solution for the difficulty 
derived from heterogeneity that characterizes the symbolic diversities of each 
nation involved.  The base component of the formality of most free trade 
agreements is the consideration that the behavior of regulated subjects and 
regulating subjects is not strategic.  This is to suppose that the subject’s 
decisions do not consider the actions or reactions of others and that 
competence is perfect.50 
 
 45. See NORTH, supra note 7, at 36 (“In the modern Western world, we think of life and the 
economy as being ordered by formal laws and property rights. Yet formal rules, in even the most 
developed economy, make up a small (although very important) part of the sum of constraints 
that shape choices; a moment’s reflection should suggest to us the pervasiveness of informal 
constraints. In our daily interaction with others, whether within the family, in external social 
relations, or in business activities, the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of 
conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions. Underlying these informal constraints are formal 
rules, but these are seldom the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions.”). 
 46. In Rome, patulsius is related to the face of the god on the front door of his temple in 
Roman forum, and clusivius the opposite face. 
 47. See generally Julia Barrágan, La Realizabilidad de los Sistemas Éticos [Realization of 
Ethic Systems], 4 TELOS: CUADEMOS DE COMUNICACIÓN, TECNOLOGÍA Y SOCIEDAD (1995). 
 48. See JULIA BARRAGÁN & ARMANDO RODRÍGUEZ, LA PLURALIDAD DE LOS UNIVERSOS 
CULTURALES Y LA UNIDAD DEL DERECHO [PLURALITY OF CULTURAL UNIVERSES AND LAW] 
141–76 (1993). 
 49. J. HESSEN, TEORÍA DE CONOCIMIENTO [Knowledge Theory] 115–19 (1981). 
 50. Julia Barragán, El Juego de la Competencia, in LOS DILEMAS DE LA COMPETENCIA 
[Problems of Competence] 20 (1999) (“The model of equilibrium, both individually and market, 
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A market of perfect competence may be defined by four conditions, which 
warrant that economic agents operate without any consciousness of strategic 
interaction among themselves.51 The first condition requires the number of 
buyers and sellers to be big enough to inhibit an operator to influence the 
price.52  The second condition prohibits the establishment of barriers for 
entrance of potential buyers or sellers.53  The third condition requires the goods 
to be “perfectly homogeneous,” and the fourth warrants that all agents have all 
the information on price distributions announced by the sellers.54 
Additionally, the formality supposes the existence of a cooperative game55 
with transference of utilities, where a solution is a coalition and share of 
payments proposal that warrants stability (i.e., none of the participants is 
interested in breaking the agreement).  In cooperative games, the possibility of 
some players arriving at mandatory agreements is present, so the negotiations 
for those rules defining the mandatory agreement restrict the utilities that each 
party of the coalition may obtain from the normative solution.  In free trade 
agreements, if the idea is that states believe the future is important to them and 
if all states’ abilities to produce events is expanded, then cooperation is 
possible even in a world of selfish states with no central authority.56 
Social sciences have explored the problems of cooperation from diverse 
perspectives.  Even if the rational idea of maximizing the parties’ utilities is 
accepted, it may be found that for some players it is worth cooperating with 
other players when the game is repeated because they will then possess 
information regarding previous actions by the small number of players.  It is 
difficult to sustain cooperation when the game is not repeated (or when the 
game is final), when there is not enough information on the players or when 
the number of players is large.  In general, cooperative behavior is observed 
when individuals act repeatedly, the parties have enough information and the 
group is characterized by few participants.57 
The correlation between behavior intended to maximize wealth and the 
results of that behavior has constituted a key factor in the evolution of the 
game theory. The classic prisoner dilemma suggests a discouraging perspective 
on cooperation and coordination among actors and offers a static nature 
 
generally acknowledges a “model of perfect competence” as the core framework for 
interpretation of the rules governing competence. The assumptions on which the basic model is 
built are: (1) both bidders are plaintiff price acceptors; (2) the market entry is free; and (3) there is 
a non-strategic behavior of the bidders.” (English translation)). 
 51. JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ, STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND MARKETS 1 (1999). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. JOAQUIN PEREZ ET AL., TEORÍA DE JUEGOS [Game Theory] 48 (2004). 
 56. See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 174 (1984). 
 57. Id. at 130–31. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
308 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:295 
because the game is only played once.  However, the reality of interaction 
among players shows interaction with more than one move.  In a repeated 
game of the prisoner dilemma, there is no dominant strategy.  Besides, the 
dilemma is diminished when it is accepted that the established regulatory 
structure does not offer a better option than betrayal. 
Norms offer a powerful mechanism to regulate conflict or cooperation 
among actors. The most common definitions of norms are based on 
expectations, values and behavior.  Definitions based on expectations or values 
are preferred by the study of norms, for they exist in a determined interaction.  
This perspective may show the actors’ beliefs and values, but observing real 
behavior is more difficult.  Robert Axelrod offers a definition that includes the 
different perspectives: “A norm exists in a determined social situation in the 
way individuals act in a certain way and are frequently punished when they act 
differently.”58  According to this definition, a norm is determined by how often 
a behavior is repeated and how an actor is punished by not behaving in such a 
way. 
An evolutionary approximation of norm dynamics is based in the 
pragmatic principle that something good for a player has more possibilities of 
being repeated, while something that offers poor results is discarded.59  
Additionally, there is no need for rational calculus to identify the best strategy.  
Instead, according to Axelrod, the analysis is based on the idea that effective 
strategies have more chances of being repeated than ineffective ones.60  
Besides, this approximation allows the apparition of new strategies as “random 
mutations of old strategies.”61 The players learn by trial and error, maintaining 
effective strategies and altering the ones offering poorer results.62  Lastly, on 
the influence of norms, players watch each other and players with poorer 
results tend to imitate the strategies of players with better results.  In any case, 
it is not necessary to suppose that an actor is rational and comprehends all 
implications of a strategy. 
The formality of free trade agreements requires mechanisms to maintain 
the approved norms because norms offer legal security.  The agreements 
become the formalization of certain rules that search for the achievement of a 
number of objectives through the instrument.  According to this principle, it is 
important to establish some mechanisms to support rules, which is the previous 
requirement for game cooperation, according to the ideas of Robert Axelrod on 
metanorms, predomination, internalization and membership.63 
 
 58. AXELROD, supra note 19, at 47. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 47–48. 
 61. AXELROD, supra note 56, at 130–31. 
 62. AXELROD, supra note 19, at 48. 
 63. Id. at 65. 
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The existence of a formal meta-norm may be an effective way to execute a 
norm and protect it once it is established.  By relating vengeance with 
punishment, the meta-norm offers an enforcement mechanism.  In summary, a 
meta-norm is one that punishes those individuals who do not care if others 
obey the norms. 
Another mechanism to sustain the norm is the dominance of one group 
over another.  Competence between two groups may be modeled, assuming 
that desertions of a player only hurt the members of the other group and thus 
may only be punished by the other group.  An illustrative example may be the 
case of a big power interacting with smaller nations.  For example, when the 
United States interacts with a South American nation, the United States not 
only has a favorable position in a determined bilateral interaction, but they also 
may have more simultaneous interactions than other nations.  Thus, its 
behavior has a stronger impact on the development of rules in South American 
countries. 
The greatest objective of a free trade agreement is achieving the 
internalization of the established norms.  Frequently, norms are internalized, 
which means that breaking them is psychologically hurtful even when material 
benefits are positive.  In terms of a norm game, internalization means that the 
temptation of breaking the norms generates negative results instead of positive 
ones.  If the parties in a bilateral agreement internalize the norms, there is no 
incentive for breaking them and the norm is stable.64 
Voluntary membership into a group that works together for a common goal 
is also a method of maintaining norms.  Agreements may bring a certain power 
to impose obligations on the actors involved.  According to Axelrod, the power 
of membership works in three ways, in that it: 
a) Affects the utility function (of one party in the agreement); 
b) Allows the actors with similar ideas to interact among themselves, and 
this self-selection makes it easier to execute the implicit norm of the 
agreement; and 
c) The proper agreement defines what is expected from each participant.65 
From another perspective, the free trade agreements are also determined by an 
underlying structure related to commercial interaction that is more complex 
when it is integrated by nations with different cultural backgrounds.  This 
 
 64. See JOHN FINLEY SCOTT, INTERNALIZATION OF NORMS: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF 
MORAL COMMITMENT 88 (1971). 
 65. AXELROD, supra note 19, at 59. 
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underlying net is filled with diverse beliefs that determine the achievement or 
failure of the objectives.66 
Free trade agreements, from construction to operation, are the result of the 
permanent dynamic among formal and informal institutions, between the 
formality of normative decisions and its connection with the underlying 
structures filled with cultural and behavioral diversities.67 
The main component of the underlying structure is the maximization of the 
players’ utilities, supported by their strategic behavior inside the limits 
established by the norms.  This is the importance of pre-normative space where 
the negotiations happen to establish the limits of strategic behavior because 
once the free trade agreements are established, the possibilities of utility 
redistribution are limited.  Hence, the legitimacy of the free trade agreements is 
based mostly on the influence of the formally established rules on the 
underlying structure.  One option is for players to adjust their behavior to the 
legal framework.  But the subject is more complex because players decide their 
behavior after calculating the maximization of utilities, the possibilities of 
obeying or disobeying the norm and the risk of sanction.68 
On the other hand, informal underlying structures are closely related to the 
reality of scenarios of interaction through a conceptual context integrating 
imperfect competence as one of its pillars. Imperfect competence also 
abandons the unrealistic model of perfect competence,69 which is just a 
simulation instrument.70  A market that comes from the model “From Perfect 
 
 66. NORTH, supra note 7, at 8 (stating that the economic history of the 19th century in the 
United States showed growth due to the reinforced incentives of the institutional framework for 
organizations participating in productive activities). 
 67. See Julia Barragán, La Influencia de las Decisiones Normativas en la Construcción del 
Lenguaje Social [The Influence of Normative Decisions on the Construction of the Social 
Language], 12 RELEA 95–106 (2000). 
 68. LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER, THE NEW ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW: LEGAL RULES AS 
INCENTIVES 27–55 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1988) (“The naïve theory that agents generally adapt 
their behavior to the pattern required by legal norms is based in the idea that the norm itself offers 
enough reason for action.”). 
 69. See David M. G. Newbery & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Inferior Trade, 51 REV. OF 
ECON. STUDIES 1–12.  According to Joseph Stiglitz, the free market is an inferior part of 
autocracy.  This is a contrary opinion to the usually accepted one.  Stiglitz considers that the idea 
of free market advantages is far away from reality when assuming a perfect competence and by 
supposing: (1) The existence of full employment in the models; (2) The existence of perfect risks; 
(3) Prices offer all the required coordination for markets to work; (4) Net earnings of liberal 
business are positive for the winners may compensate the losers and balance the general situation 
in a country; and (5) Inexistence of informatics externalities.  See also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 54–78 (2006). 
 70. GABSZEWICZ, supra note 51, at 2 (“[P]erfect competition is a cas d´école which is rarely 
observed in real market situations. Far from being strategically ‘isolated’, economic agents seem 
on the contrary to behave in a way which is the most advantageous to them from the viewpoint of 
their strategic interaction. . . . This is essentially due to the normative properties of perfect 
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to Imperfect Competition” may be examined from the following structural 
elements: 
1. The number of agents: entry, barriers to entry and collusion: 
 A small number of sellers: monopoly and duopoly; 
 The role of investment as barrier to entry; 
 The stability of collusive agreements. 
2. Product differentiation: 
 Monopoly and product differentiation; 
 Duopoly and product differentiation. 
3. Imperfect information: 
 Imperfect information about prices; 
 Imperfect information about quality. 
4. Imperfect competition: 
 Equilibrium and attractor; 
 Cooperation vs. non-cooperation; 
 Search for rentals; 
 Institutions asymmetric; 
 Regulatory Capture.71 
The underlying structure tends to be based on a non-cooperative approach 
that has the players’ desire of utility maximization as a natural pillar.  A non-
cooperative approach tends to explore which decisions a player would make in 
order to maximize its utilities, even with a preexisting agreement.  Game 
theory emphasizes the non-cooperative approach, illustrates cooperation 
problems and explores specific strategies while also sharing neoclassic models 
by assuming that the players’ only desire is to maximize their utility.72  
Nevertheless, the players’ behavior is more complex because cooperation is the 
element that maintains the collective cohesion allowing games to be played.73  
Players often act with incomplete information and subjective models, which is 
why institutions and rules have helped to decrease costs in the interaction of 
players, whether they are companies or states.  The formal rules created by 
actors, as an agreement between two countries, are instituted to obtain the 
expected results, to offer new interaction ideas and to understand shared 
 
competition: while pursuing their private interests as price-takers, economic agents spontaneously 
realize their collective advantage.”). 
 71. Id.  See generally MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Henryk 
Kierzkowski ed., 1984) (compiling a collection of articles representing research on imperfect 
competence and international trade). 
 72. AXELROD, supra note 19, at 47. 
 73. See id. 
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development.  From its base, a non-cooperative approach starts from the 
definition of interaction structures, which limit the transfer of utilities.74  In this 
approach the actor looks forward to maximize utilities without considering 
external social or environmental factors.  The desire, not the reason, gives the 
action the true cause of the aptitudes.  This approach integrates, as a main 
value, selfishness and the desire of utility concentration without considering 
external negativities that may be generated. 
LINKS BETWEEN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND IMPACTS 
The links that may be derived from the free trade agreements and their 
economic, social, environmental and political impacts are not based in a 
Newtonian causality of the celestial machine translated into the social sciences 
(if it is A, it is B).75  Nor are these links based in the imputation link of Hans 
Kelsen’s pure theory of law (if it is A, it must be B).76  They do not go to the 
extreme of negation between cause and effect as articulated by David Hume.77  
The tendency is to be placed between the spheres of certainty and uncertainty 
by presenting the possibilities that are determined by free trade agreements, 
where circumstances limit the projections of probable impacts and ultimately 
define the structure of interaction between the states and the other structures of 
the game among players.  The mentioned sphere is placed among the concepts 
of Aristotelian roots,78 passing by Kant79 and arriving to Werner Heisenberg’s 
principle of uncertainty that is reflected in the results of free trade agreements 
and their consequences.80 
 
 74. See generally Barragán, supra note 50. 
 75. Newton’s second law establishes variation in linear momentum is proportional to 
resultant force action upon it.  See Glenn Research Center, Newton’s Second Law: Definitions, 
NASA, http://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/newton2.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
 76. See generally HANS KELSEN, TEORÍA PURA DEL DERECHO [Pure Theory of Law] (1999) 
(Chapter 2 discusses legal norms as object of legal science.  See Hans Kelsen’s observations of 
causal science and normative science, causality and imputation, natural and legal law, imputation 
principle on primitive thoughts, the origin of the causality principle on imputation, causal social 
science and normative social science, differences between causality and imputation principles.). 
 77. GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 551 (4th ed. 1973) (explaining 
that, according to David Hume, if we limit ourselves to accept only experience, it is not possible 
to observe power in A to produce B, nor the relation between A and B when A and B occur 
together). 
 78. See MAURICIO SALDAÑA RODRÍGUEZ & MANUEL DÍAZ CID, ANÁLISIS POLÍTICO 
CONTEMPORÁNEO: HERRAMIENTAS SELECTAS [Contemporary Political Analysis] 91 (2005) 
(explaining that Aristotle established four causes: (1) Essential cause; (2) Material cause; (3) 
Efficient cause; and (4) Final cause). 
 79. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT: INCLUDING THE FIRST INTRODUCTION 
(Werner S. Pluhar trans., Hackett Publishing Company 1987) (1790). 
 80. Julia Barragán, El Manejo de la Incertidumbre [The Operation of Uncertainty], in 
RESOLUCIÓN DE CONFLICTOS 13–33 (Victor A. Pizani ed., 2004). 
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Relating the social, environmental and political consequences of the free 
trade agreements created in South America and analyzing them from an 
interdisciplinary perspective brings out the causal link81 that is built in the pre-
normative spaces represented and clarifies the strengths or weaknesses of 
negotiation in the free trade agreements between the northern and southern 
countries.82 
Free trade agreements have impacts with emergent properties in various 
areas83 that go beyond the expected results in the commercial dimension to 
evaluate success, thus making it much harder to predict the total consequences 
in even simple interactions.  Therefore, restricting the universe of variables 
would only constitute an analytical barrier that could leave out some hidden 
aspects that keep South America in a state of dependency with a high cost for 
southern countries and with grave consequences for northern countries due to 
the social problems created.  These problems relate to the amount of people 
mobilized and incentivized to emigrate by institutions that create game rules 
with asymmetric goods and services trade structures. The problems include 
undervaluing raw materials exported by southern countries, troubling 
agricultural subsidies in the North and barriers to entry. 
There is a causal link between the establishment of a trade agreement and 
its social, environmental and political consequences.  In the case of the WTO, 
these consequences are evidenced by subsidies and entrance barriers for the 
agricultural sector that, with the world food crisis, have generated special 
effects in South America. Subsidized price policies discourage agricultural 
production84 and international trade, may be considered as causes for the 
decadence of multilateralism and the contradictions that have promoted the 
search for business integration alternatives. 
The subventions and protectionism of the nations of the North impose 
costs on the southern nations in the amount of twenty-four billion dollars.85  In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, eight billion dollars are lost every year as 
income in agriculture.86  The WTO’s normative decisions have impacted more 
than sixty-five million small producers in South America.  The northern 
 
 81. SEN, supra note 9, at 257 (considering that causal analysis may predict impermisible 
effects). 
 82. STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 35, 167–70. 
 83. See AXELROD, supra note 19, at 4. 
 84. See DENNIS R. APPLEYARD & ALFRED J. FIELD, ECONOMÍA INTERNACIONAL 
[International Economy] 447-448 (1997) (analyzing the subvention concept equivalent to the 
producer, which offers general proofs with respect to this matter). See also id. at 828–29 for a 
study of distortions in Pakistan agriculture. 
 85. Xinshen Diao et al., How Much Does it Hurt?  The Impact of Agricultural Trade Policies 
on Developing Countries 2 (2003), available at http://www.ifpri.org/media/trade/trade.pdf. 
 86. Id. 
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subsidies have impacted millions of artisanal small producers in the region.87  
In 2007, the United States produced seven billion gallons of bio-fuel, which 
cost taxpayers at least eight billion dollars in subsidies.88  The subsidies totaled 
more than thirty-seven billion dollars between 1995 and 2003, which equaled 
twice the subsidies for wheat, three times the subsidies for soybeans and 
seventy times the subsidies received by the cultivation of snuff.  Subsidies 
averaged seventy cents per gallon of ethanol from corn in the United States for 
bio-fuels. 
The superior negotiating capacity of the North originates not only in 
government organizations, for in many cases the causes are global 
transnational players who capture sales89 for the benefit of small groups in the 
South and the North and prejudice citizens on both sides.  For example, an 
issue of Time Magazine was titled: “Politicians and Big Business are pushing 
bio-fuels like corn-base ethanol as alternatives to oil. All they’re really doing 
is driving up food prices and making global warming worse—and you’re 
paying for it.”90 
In the food universe, corn represents special importance for alimentary 
security for many countries in South America.91  This situation becomes more 
complicated when an important part of the population is occupied in the 
agricultural sector producing for self-survival.  World Bank studies show that 
about thirty-seven percent (approximately sixty-five million people) of the 
poor in Latin America and the Caribbean live in rural areas, and according to 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in most poor countries 
agriculture accounts for fifty to eighty percent of employment.  With 
production costs that are distorted, the effect of norms allowing such self-
exceptions generate a series of economic impacts that result in a loss of jobs, as 
well as environmental,92 social and political impacts.93 
Finally, facing the possible distortions of free trade agreements, it is 
important to remember that the main objective of ethics is to preserve the 
 
 87. DIAO, supra note 85. 
 88. Michael Grunwald, The Clean Energy Myth, TIME, Apr. 7, 2008, at 44. 
 89. See generally BARRY M. MITNICK, LA ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE LA REGULACIÓN [The 
Political Economy of Regulation] (Fondo de Cultura Económica 1989). 
 90. Grunwald, supra note 88, at front cover. 
 91. In Colombia for example, the area planted in 2002 was 547,290.  Annual production was 
approximately 1.2 million tons.  The technical grade was between traditional and sophisticated.  
The traditional crop was prevalent in 75% of the area in small tracts, with non-certified seed, low 
consumption of pesticides and fertilizers in particular. The national average was 1.7 tons per 
hectare.  Most of the production is geared toward consumption. 
 92. Widening of misery belts in big cities, public sanitation and housing issues, forest 
logging, water pollution, destruction of biodiversity and erosion serve as examples. 
 93. Un-governability, ineffective normatives, illegal production with damages in consumer 
countries, money laundering and illegal immigration serve as examples. 
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conditions necessary for a clean game—i.e., a system with incentives that do 
not promote desertion or transgression of rules.94 According to Julia Barragán, 
the hypotheses of economic theory that allow the market to be a space for 
clean game are: 
1. The price character for buyers and sellers; and 
2. The absence of entrance barriers to such scenery.95 
CONCLUSION 
To achieve the benefits of free trade agreements, normative and empirical 
legitimacy is required.  Non-compliance with these two requirements produces 
the deterioration of the instruments.  If the values supporting them and the 
expected goals are not fulfilled, they enter into a process of decadence that 
generates its own destruction.  As such, free trade agreements cannot be 
unrelated with the development objectives of the integrating countries, given 
the enormous influence that they have on their existence.  The links between 
its application and the social limits have dimensions, and, if these dimensions 
are surpassed, it produces political consequences. 
In the selection of values and ends, there are two options.  The first option 
is to favor values that promote asymmetries through rules that favor the 
strongest players without considering the consequences in equilibrium and 
stability of normative solutions.  The second option is to establish values and 
ends that structure rules looking for a clean game. 
In all current trade agreements in South America, the market is maintained 
as the basic structure to assign resources and as an instrument to maintain 
social stability. Thus, taking care of the clean game in the markets until 
operation of free trade agreements is like taking care of the Crown Jewels.  The 
conditions for a clean game require the market and the parts accepting it to 
preserve it.  In summary, the values supporting the normative and empirical 
legitimacy of free trade agreements require for its preservation the 
maintenance of the principles that enable a practical application of a clean 
game. 
 
 94. Julia Barragán, La Etica Empresarial y la Confianza en el Mercado [Business’s Ethics 
and Confidence in the Market], in ÉTICA EMPRESARIAL: UNA RESPONSABILIDAD DE LAS 
ORGANIZACIONES 51 (2004) (Barragán states that the best example of an unclean game is 
presented by the Prisoner Dilemma.  The game’s structure promotes only treason.). 
 95. Id. at 43. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
316 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:295 
 
